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Epistemic infi nitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epis-
temic regress problem, claiming that the justifi cation of a given proposi-
tion requires an infi nite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this 
paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infi nitist and 
the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possi-
bility of justifi cation on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what 
makes epistemic infi nitism appear as well-equipped to silence the re-
gress skeptic is the very same thing that renders it susceptible to a power-
ful skeptical assault by the regress skeptic. 
Keywords: Epistemic infi nitism, the epistemic regress problem, 
skepticism, inferential justifi cation, Peter Klein.
    But who will guard the guardians?
                Juvenal, The Satires 6.029–34
1. Introduction
What are the conditions a given set of beliefs must meet in order for 
those beliefs to have some positive epistemic status such as being justi-
fi ed or reasonable? Epistemological theories that attempt to answer a 
question of this sort might be plausibly called “normative”. Do beliefs 
of the sort typically held by human beings actually meet the conditions 
they must meet in order for them to have the desired positive epistemic 
status? Epistemological theories that attempt to answer a question 
of this sort might be plausibly called “descriptive”. I simply introduce 
“normative” and “descriptive” as labels, hopefully in a way that refl ects 
a clear sense that might be plausibly attached to them, but without 
reading too much into them.
The main epistemological theories about the structural conditions a 
given set of beliefs must meet in order for them to be justifi ed might be 
conceived either as being merely normative or as being both normative 
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and descriptive. For instance, foundationalism conceived as a merely 
normative epistemological theory claims, roughly, that a given set of 
beliefs must be structured like a pyramid if they are to be justifi ed, at 
the bottom of which there are justifi ed foundational beliefs and at the 
upper layers of which there are beliefs that are justifi ed ultimately by 
their evidential relations to the foundational beliefs. And, foundation-
alism conceived as both a normative and a descriptive theory claims, 
roughly, not only that a given set of beliefs must be structured like a 
pyramid but also that beliefs of the sort typically held by human beings 
are structured like a pyramid. So, foundationalism qua a normative 
and descriptive theory in the sense at issue is eo ipso anti-skeptical, but 
foundationalism qua a merely normative theory need not be. A skep-
tic might approach foundationalism qua a merely normative theory in 
three broadly different ways. One is to argue that foundationalism can-
not be and therefore is not the correct normative theory (for instance, 
because, the skeptic might say, the notion of justifi ed foundational be-
lief is incoherent)—let us call this “the normative skeptical approach.” 
Another is to argue that whether or not the structural norms prescribed 
by foundationalism are correct, there is something about those norms 
that entails that no beliefs can be justifi ed (for instance, the skeptic 
might argue that justifi cation can only be “internal” and yet that foun-
dational beliefs can only be justifi ed if “external” justifi cation is pos-
sible)—let us call this “the skeptical outcome approach.” Yet another 
one is to argue that beliefs of the sort typically held by human beings do 
not rise to the challenge of satisfying the structural norms prescribed 
by foundationalism, whether or not those norms are correct—let us call 
this “the descriptive skeptical approach.” Of course, these three skepti-
cal approaches are not mutually exclusive.
Foundationalism is the oldest game in the town of epistemologists. 
In this paper, I am interested in a relatively novel contender, namely, 
infi nitism qua a merely normative theory, an epistemological theory 
whose history is characterized either by comforting oblivion or by quick 
dismissal but that has received considerable and well-deserved atten-
tion in recent years mainly due to the pioneering defense of Peter Klein.1 
More specifi cally, I am interested in whether the regress skeptic can 
plausibly adopt what I have labelled “the skeptical outcome approach” 
against the infi nitist.2 As we shall see, there are good reasons, stem-
1 Here is a representative but incomplete list of Klein’s works that defend 
epistemic infi nitism: (1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2005a, b, 2007a, b, 2011, 2014). Klein’s 
works have inspired a large and still growing literature on infi nitism. Here is again a 
representative but incomplete sample: Fantl (2003), Cling (2004), Aikin (2005, 2008, 
2011), Wright (2013).
2 A formidable and familiar skeptical challenge against infi nitism is descriptive, 
taking its cue either from the fi niteness of the human mind or the fi niteness of the 
amount of time available to human beings. In this paper, I leave the descriptive 
skeptical approach aside, which is not to say that the apparent contrast between 
what infi nitism demands and what human beings can in principle offer is of no 
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ming from the norms governing what one might call “the reason-giving 
game,” for thinking that infi nitism is tailor-made for defusing the skep-
tical outcome approach and it turns out that it is unclear whether the 
regress skeptic is in a position to adopt that approach.
This paper is hereafter divided into seven sections. In section 2, 
I attempt to show how infi nitism is naturally suggested as the cor-
rect normative account of epistemic justifi cation by the reason-giving 
game. In section 3, the move from the reason-giving game to infi nitism 
is clarifi ed by making some of its central assumptions explicit and is 
defended against some main objections. In section 4, I raise the ques-
tion of whether the skeptic is in a position to adopt the skeptical out-
come approach against infi nitism, given that the reason-giving game 
between the skeptic and a given subject meeting the norms of infi nit-
ism ought rationally to result in a tie. A proper answer to this question, 
I maintain, requires taking a closer look at the question of why exactly 
infi nitism is suggested by the reason-giving game, and I argue in sec-
tion 5 that the answer to the latter question lies in a particular feature 
of inferential justifi cation. In section 6, I claim that the very feature 
of inferential justifi cation I specify that is responsible for why infi nit-
ism is suggested by the reason-giving game can be deployed by the 
regress skeptic in an argument against infi nitism: an ultimate tragedy 
of infi nitism is that what makes it appear as well-equipped to silence 
the skeptical outcome approach is the very same thing that renders it 
susceptible to a powerful assault by that approach. Section 7 discusses 
some infi nitist responses to the skeptical assault and fi nds them incon-
clusive. Section 8 sums up the lesson.
2. The reason-giving game and epistemic infi nitism
Michael and Susan are two intellectually sophisticated subjects and 
they decide to play a game, one quite familiar to epistemologists, which 
they call “the reason-giving game.” They pick a proposition, P, and they 
both assume that Michael believes that P. Now, Susan is the “detec-
tive”, and adopts the role of an inquisitive and “maximally persistent”3 
inquirer whose aim is to discover whether Michael’s belief that P is 
epistemically justifi ed. And, Michael is the “defender”, as persistent 
as the detective, whose aim is to persuade Susan that his belief that 
P is epistemically justifi ed by defending it. The game comes in “steps”, 
epistemological signifi cance. The normative skeptical approach against infi nitism 
is less popular but formidable all the same. The skeptic might argue, for instance, 
that infi nitism requires the existence of an actual infi nity and also argue, along 
with Aristotle, that the notion of actual infi nity is incoherent—hence that infi nitism 
cannot be the correct account of norms governing justifi cation. In this paper, I also 
leave the normative skeptical approach aside.
3 Compare Leite (2005): “Imagine that someone invites you to defend a belief. You 
offer what you take to be a good reason for believing as you do, but your interlocutor 
asks you to support this reason and continues in like fashion in each step…I call this 
character ‘the persistent interlocutor’” (p. 397).
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composed of a “what reason?” question and a “my reason” answer. The 
fi rst step starts with a question that Susan raises, “What reason do 
you have for believing that P?”, and ends with Michael’s citing reasons 
that support P, reasons which they both assume Michael believes and 
thus sincerely offers. They both agree that a reason cited in support of 
P does not render Michael’s belief that P justifi ed if that reason itself 
needs to be supported but is not supported by further reasons. So, the 
game does not end at the fi rst step if the reason Michael cites in sup-
port of P needs to be supported in order for it to justify his belief that 
P. Susan’s job is to reiterate the question at each step in a suitable 
form, and Michael’s job is to answer it by citing new reasons. They both 
agree that Michael loses the game if all he can do at a particular step 
is to cite a reason which he has cited at a previous step or if there is 
a step at which he cannot cite any new reasons. They also agree that 
Michael wins the game if, and only if, there comes a step where Su-
san ought to be persuaded that Michael’s belief that P is epistemically 
justifi ed. And, by this, they mean that Michael wins the game if, and 
only if, there comes a step at which the “what reason?” question cannot 
be legitimately iterated, i.e., cannot be iterated without its losing the 
rationale it serves at the very fi rst and previous steps, the rationale in 
virtue of which the game has kept going until that step.
A natural and tempting line of thought delivers the result that Mi-
chael cannot win the reason-giving game conceived in the way above.4 
The rationale of raising the “what reason?” question at the fi rst step 
is that Michael’s persuading Susan that his belief that P is justifi ed 
requires an answer to that question. For all Susan knows at the out-
set, Michael’s belief that P might be based on a sheer guess, a hunch, 
or might simply have come “out of the blue”, in which case she ought 
not to be persuaded that it is a justifi ed belief. As the fi rst step ends 
with Michael’s citing a reason, R1, for P, the rationale of raising the 
“what reason?” reason remains intact at the second step: for all Susan 
knows at the second step, Michael’s belief that R1 might be based on a 
sheer guess, a hunch, or might simply have come “out of the blue”, in 
which case she ought not to be persuaded that his belief that R1 or his 
belief that P is justifi ed. And, obviously, after the second step ends with 
Michael’s citing a reason, R2, for R1, the rationale of raising the “what 
reason?” question is kept at the third step, and the same goes for all 
the subsequent steps. This means that, whatever n is, the reason Rn 
Michael cites at the nth step needs to be supported in order for him to 
persuade Susan that his belief that Rn and his belief that P is justifi ed. 
So, there is no step at which the “what reason?” question can possibly 
lose the rationale it has at the previous steps, which entails that Mi-
chael cannot win the reason-giving game.
4 That Michael cannot win the reason-giving game above does not follow from the 
way the game is defi ned above. (Thanks to a reviewer for pressing on this point.) An 
argument that Michael cannot win the reason-giving game is offered in what follows.
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It is thus plausible to say that Michael cannot win the reason-giving 
game and that the best he can do is not to lose it. In order for him not 
to lose the game, Michael must be in a position to cite a reason at each 
step, one that he has not cited at one of the previous steps; and, since 
the “what reason?” question can (in principle) be legitimately iterated 
by the maximally persistent inquirer Susan indefi nitely, the following 
must be true of Michael if he is not to lose the game: there must be an 
infi nite set of reasons available to Michael arranged in a non-repeating 
series such that the fi rst member, R1 is a reason for P, and the second 
member, R2 is a reason for R1, and the third member, R3 is a reason for 
R2, and so on. So, in order for Michael not to lose the game, the structure 
of his reasons must be infi nite and non-repeating. That is to say, his 
reasons must be structured in the way epistemic infi nitism says they 
must. Epistemic infi nitism is a normative epistemological thesis about 
how our beliefs must be organized in order for them to be justifi ed, and 
it claims that a necessary condition for a series of reasons to lend justi-
fi cation to a proposition is that it must have no repeating members and 
has no last member. A general moral that can be plausibly drawn from 
the reason-giving game is that the best we can do in the way of having 
justifi ed beliefs is by having at our disposal an infi nite chain of reasons 
structured in the way the epistemic infi nitist says it must.5
An important distinction any account of epistemic justifi cation in-
cluding epistemic infi nitism must respect is between propositional and 
doxastic justifi cation.6 Propositional justifi cation is a property of a prop-
osition that it has relative to a given subject, irrespective of whether 
the subject believes the proposition. We can say that a proposition, P, is 
propositionally justifi ed for a subject, S, only if there is a (good) reason 
for P that is available to S (irrespective of whether S believes that P). 
Doxastic justifi cation, on the other hand, is a property of a subject’s al-
ready formed believing attitude towards a certain proposition. We can 
say that S’s (actual) believing that P is doxastically justifi ed just in case 
P is propositionally justifi ed for S and S bases his believing attitude on 
the reason (or the chain of reasons) by which P is propositionally justi-
fi ed for S. Doxastic justifi cation is thus propositional justifi cation plus 
the basing relation.7 This is a tidy picture, and here is a little complica-
tion: suppose S believes that P, and P is justifi ed for S, but S’s believing 
that P is not justifi ed (because the basing requirement is not satisfi ed). 
What can we say about the justifi catory status of S’s belief that P—is 
it justifi ed or not? Suppose one simply insists for a “yes-or-no” answer 
(and does not accept a “yes-and-no” answer). Clearly, such an answer to 
this question must be stipulative in nature. I hereby make the stipula-
5 Compare Aikin: “In essence, the thought behind the (infi nitist) view is that if 
you know, you can answer questions about what you know until there just aren’t 
any more questions. But, as it turns out, there are in principle no fi nal questions. So, 
knowers need to be able to keep coming with answers” (2009: 57).
6 The distinction is fi rst introduced by Firth (1978).
7 For a critical discussion, see Turri (2010).
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tion that S’s belief that P is justifi ed if and only if S believes that P and 
P is propositionally justifi ed for S. Given this, the answer I give to the 
question is yes. In what follows, whenever I talk about the justifi ca-
tory status of a given belief without qualifi cation, I will have in mind 
solely considerations that pertain to the propositional justifi cation of 
its content.
Now, the question that arises is this: is Susan the detective at-
tempting to fi gure out whether (i) Michael’s believing that P is justifi ed 
or whether (ii) Michael’s belief that P is justifi ed? The answer is “both”. 
This is because what Susan is at bottom interested in is whether P is 
propositionally justifi ed for Michael, and also because both Michael’s 
believing that P and Michael’s belief that P requires that P be proposi-
tionally justifi ed for Michael. To see why, consider the following. If one 
opts for (i), then Susan is to be conceived as trying to discover whether 
Michael’s believing that P is doxastically justifi ed. Since doxastic jus-
tifi cation requires propositional justifi cation and basing, Susan is then 
trying to discover whether P is propositionally justifi ed for Michael and 
Michael bases his believing attitude towards P on the reason by which 
P is propositionally justifi ed for Michael. Furthermore, since it might 
be plausibly assumed that a subject bases his believing attitude to-
wards a proposition on a reason if (though not necessarily only if) he 
sincerely cites the reason in support of the proposition, then the bas-
ing requirement for doxastic justifi cation is automatically satisfi ed as 
soon as Michael sincerely cites a reason in response to a “what reason?” 
question raised by Susan at a particular step. So, if one opts for (i), then 
one is entitled to say that what Susan is at bottom trying to discover is 
whether P is propositionally justifi ed for Michael. And, if one opts for 
(ii), Susan is to be conceived as trying to discover whether P is propo-
sitionally justifi ed for Michael and Michael believes that P. Since it is 
assumed by both of our subjects that Michael believes that P (and the 
reason he offers in support of P and the reason he offers in support of 
the reason he has offered for P, and so on), one is entitled to say, if one 
opts for (ii), that what Susan is at bottom trying to discover is whether 
P is propositionally justifi ed for Michael. So, irrespective of whether (i) 
or (ii) is to be adopted, the reason-giving game between Michael and 
Susan centers on the question of whether P is propositionally justi-
fi ed for Michael. Accordingly, epistemic infi nitism that is strongly sug-
gested by the reason-giving game is to be conceived, at least in the fi rst 
instance, as an account of the condition a subject must meet in order for 
a proposition to be propositionally justifi ed for him. Epistemic infi nit-
ism about propositional justifi cation is the claim that the condition a 
subject must meet in order for a proposition to be justifi ed for him is 
that there must be infi nitely many reasons available to him structured 
in a non-repeating way.
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3. Caveats
Various clarifi cations and qualifi cations are required in order to fortify 
the move from what we can plausibly derive from the reason-giving 
game to epistemic infi nitism. First, a main moral of the reason-giving 
game is that there is no forthcoming step at which the “what reason?” 
question loses the rationale it has at the previous steps. This is consis-
tent with the fact that at times we seem to be engaging in something 
relevantly like the reason-giving game and adopting the detective role 
in ordinary quotidian contexts, there is always an nth step at which 
we qua ordinary beings with fi nite amount of time, perseverance, and 
guided mainly by pragmatic concerns concede a reason provided with 
us at that step (or perhaps resolve the issue with our fi sts or just leave 
the scene). The idea, however, is that we are never rationally compelled 
to do so, and as such the moral of the reason-giving game is normative 
and abstracts away from what we actually do or tend to do in similar 
circumstances.8
Secondly, and relatedly, the rules of the reason-giving game and 
the rationale behind it appear to isolate some of the core features of the 
ordinary conception of how a rational dialectic between two speakers 
should go, rather than resting on or taking for granted a set of stan-
dards that are far removed from the standards governing an ordinary 
dialogue that we would ordinarily take to be rational. There are surely 
everyday conversational contexts in which a particular speaker might 
wish to fi gure out the reason behind one of the beliefs of the other 
speaker. “So, you believe that Trump will make America great again, 
why is that?” A question like this might normally stem from a suspi-
cion about the truth of what is believed or from a desire to see whether 
the person that has the belief is justifi ed. In any case, we do not feel 
that the question is always “off the mark”, “odd” or “inappropriate” but 
can easily imagine everyday contexts in which the person that has the 
belief ought to provide an answer if his belief is to count as reasonable 
or justifi ed. Now, it is true that ordinary conversational contexts are 
typically characterized by a “common ground,” a set of “background 
assumptions” that are shared by speakers and ultimately serve as dia-
lectical regress-stoppers. Beliefs about basic arithmetic (“2+2=4”), the 
8 A reviewer raises the following worry: “If I assert that I ate potatoes for 
breakfast, and someone says I’m not reasonable in believing unless I can publically 
defend it, I think they are wrong. And, I think it has nothing to do with how much 
time I have on my hands.” In response, let me fi rst note that I claim above that 
the fact that there is no forthcoming step in the reason-giving game at which the 
“what reason?” question loses the rationale it has at the previous steps is consistent 
with the fact that there is always an nth step at which we actually concede a reason 
provided with us at that step. I have argued in the previous section for the claim that 
there is no forthcoming step at which the “what reason?” question loses its initial 
rationale. So, if the reviewer cannot answer the “what reason?” question raised for 
the belief that I ate potatoes for breakfast, then s/he would lose the reason-giving 
game as the game is defi ned. What this has to do with justifi cation is clarifi ed below.
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immediate environment (“Here is a hand”), one’s own occurrent mental 
states (“I feel pain”), “hinge” propositions (“There is an external world”) 
do usually provide the background against which ordinary dialectical 
exchanges take place. So, there is a sense in which an attempt to ques-
tion what is ordinarily taken to be a “common ground” between speak-
ers is bound to appear “off the mark” or “odd”. However, despite this, 
it might be plausibly argued that there is again no special diffi culty 
ordinary speakers feel in admitting that there is a clear sense in which 
just as any other belief, the beliefs belonging to the common ground 
are not unquestionable but stand in need of the support of reasons, and 
that the fact that our interlocutors usually let us get away with mak-
ing such assertions as “I have a hand” is consistent with the fact that 
we as ordinary speakers can easily imagine conversational contexts in 
which questioning them is appropriate. Why doesn’t the idea that the 
beliefs ordinarily viewed as belonging to the common ground are not 
unquestionable strike ordinary speakers as strange, wild, or absurd, 
as something that they ought to reject given their conception of a ra-
tional conversation? It is, it might be argued, because there is a norm 
ordinary speakers are willing to admit that applies to all beliefs across 
the board: be ready to provide reasons for any of your beliefs when 
challenged, if they are to count as reasonable. The reason-giving game 
takes for granted and is built on a norm along these lines, a norm, one 
might plausibly argue, that is not “strange” or “wild” but is treated by 
ordinary speakers as ultimately correct.9
Thirdly, and relatedly again, the argument that Michael cannot win 
the reason-giving game presupposes what one might call the “unrestrict-
ed-defense” view, according to which all beliefs asserted in the reason-
giving game require defense in the light of requests for reasons—when 
challenged by the “what reason?” question. On this view, there are no 
privileged beliefs whose assertions cannot be legitimately disputed by 
raising the “what reason?” question. The unrestricted-defense view can 
be contrasted with what one might call the “unrestricted-challenge” 
view and the “restricted-challenge” view. The unrestricted-challenge 
view holds that all beliefs are “presumptively rational” or are “defea-
sible presumptions” in that one can only challenge their assertions by 
providing grounds or reasons for doubting them and not by merely rais-
ing the “what reason?” question.10 The restricted-challenge view holds 
that only some beliefs are presumptively rational.11 I will not attempt 
to adjudicate between these views, but remain content with maintain-
9 The central aim of this section is to disclose those main assumptions that 
connect the reason-giving game to epistemic infi nitism, while showing that those 
assumptions are not gratuitous. The argument provided above is not, and is not 
intended to be, a decisive argument on behalf of the norm in question, but it is, and 
is intended to be, an argument that shows that the norm is to be taken seriously. 
Thanks to a reviewer’s comment that prompts this note.
10 See Adler (2002).
11 See Brandom (1994).
 E. Demircioğlu, Epistemic Infi nitism, the Reason-Giving Game 89
ing that the argument that Michael cannot win the reason-giving game 
presupposes the unrestricted-defense view. 
Fourthly, the reason-giving game presupposes that a given subject’s 
belief that P is justifi ed only if the subject has the ability to defend (or 
is in a position to cite a reason for) the belief. This is questionable. It 
seems clear that non-linguistic creatures and human infants can have 
justifi ed beliefs despite the fact that they are not able to cite reasons 
for their beliefs. Moreover, adult humans may have justifi ed beliefs 
despite the fact that the original reasons for those beliefs, though com-
pelling, have long since been forgotten. The fact that the subject is now 
at a loss if asked to justify his belief does not show that his belief is 
thereby unjustifi ed. The main point here is that the state of holding 
a justifi ed belief is to be distinguished from the activity of justifying a 
belief or from having the ability to justify it. This is an important point, 
which must be granted, and it calls for a qualifi cation. The qualifi cation 
required is this: there is a sense of justifi ed belief in which a subject’s 
belief that P is justifi ed only if the subject has the ability to defend (or is 
in a position to cite a reason for) the belief. This is the sense of justifi ed 
belief as essentially the product of the refl ective activity of examining 
our beliefs and determining which, if any, are worthy of being kept. 
And, this is the sense of justifi ed belief that accords well with the no-
tion of a responsible epistemic agent seeking to retain only those beliefs 
worthy of being retained.12 In this sense of the term, it seems that the 
distinction between the state of holding a justifi ed belief and the activ-
ity of justifying a belief is largely bogus. And in this sense of the term, 
neither non-linguistic creatures nor human infants can have justifi ed 
beliefs. And the same goes for adult humans that have forgotten the 
reasons they once had for their beliefs.
Fifthly, and fi nally, the move from the fact that the best we can do 
in the reason-giving game is by having at our disposal an infi nite and 
non-repeating chain of reasons to epistemic infi nitism is suspicious. 
Here it must be observed that the reason-giving game involves a dis-
cursive practice, a dialectical interaction between two subjects. And, 
epistemic infi nitism is a thesis about how the propositions available 
to a subject must be structured in order for the subject to be justifi ed 
in believing those propositions. Now, it is questionable whether the 
normative rules governing a rational discursive practice have anything 
essential to do with the epistemological concerns about the structure of 
justifi ed beliefs. In particular, it might be claimed that while it might 
be true that in order for Michael to be rational in his attempt to defend 
his belief that P or to persuade Susan that his belief that P is justifi ed, 
he must be in a position to cite new reasons at each step, it does not 
follow that Michael’s belief that P is justifi ed only if the structure of his 
12 Compare also Aikin: “Epistemic infi nitism…holds that those who know are 
those who have been maximally intellectually responsible…Who would say that 
someone knows that p, if asked why he believes it, he shrugged his shoulders and 
uttered an inarticulate “hmmm… idunno”?” (2009: 57–8, emphasis mine).
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reasons must be infi nite and non-repeating. So, it might be argued that 
one can, for instance, consistently defend epistemic foundationalism 
(the view that the epistemic regress must halt at basic beliefs (i.e. jus-
tifi ed beliefs that are not justifi ed in virtue of other beliefs) if one is to 
have justifi ed beliefs at all) while acknowledging that rational defense 
or persuasion in the reason-giving game requires having the capacity 
to cite new reasons at all forthcoming steps: epistemic infi nitism does 
not follow from what one might call dialectical infi nitism. This is an im-
portant point but there are two things that can be said in response. One 
is that the reason-giving game does not strictly require two subjects 
and can be played with only one subject adopting both the roles of a de-
tective and a defender. If the moral of the reason-giving game with two 
subjects is dialectical infi nitism, then the moral of that game with only 
one subject engaged in a sotto voce dialog is also dialectical infi nitism. 
The other is that the distinction between epistemic and dialectical in-
fi nitism is again largely bogus if the relevant sense of justifi ed belief is 
one that conceives justifi cation as an epistemic status that the subject 
must earn through engaging in an activity of justifying in order for him 
to have justifi ed beliefs, that is, if having justifi cation rests essentially 
on an activity of justifying.13
With these points in mind, it appears that the move from what must 
be true of Michael, our hypothetical subject defending his belief that P, 
in order for him not to lose the reason-giving game to epistemic infi nit-
ism is safe. In this connection, it is important to realize that Klein, a 
prominent epistemic infi nitist, actually argues against epistemic foun-
dationalism by an argument that rests on the normative rules govern-
ing reason-giving procedures (2004: 14–15). Consider an epistemic foun-
dationalist, Fred, who takes his belief that P to be epistemically basic. 
Sally, a persistent interlocutor, asks Fred his reason for believing that 
P. According to Klein, Fred faces a dilemma here. He may either simply 
say that there is no reason that he can offer for believing that P but still 
insist that P, or realize that it is in virtue of its having a certain prop-
erty, F, he takes the belief that P as epistemically basic and say that the 
belief that P has F and that beliefs with F are likely to be true. If Fred 
takes the fi rst horn, then his belief that P is dogmatic and he ought ra-
tionally to abandon it. And, if he takes the second horn, then the regress 
continues by the question “What reason do you have for thinking that 
beliefs that have F are likely to be true?” and contra Fred the epistemic 
foundationalist, his belief that P is not a regress-stopper and is thus 
not epistemically basic. The lesson Klein derives about the reason-giv-
ing game Fred and Sally engage in is that the epistemic foundational-
ist “can’t be an epistemically responsible agent and practice what he 
preaches” (2004: 15). And, this lesson about the reason-giving game is 
what grounds Klein’s claim that epistemic foundationalism “advocates 
accepting an arbitrary reason at the base” (1999: 297).
13 For further discussion, see Rescorla (2009).
 E. Demircioğlu, Epistemic Infi nitism, the Reason-Giving Game 91
4. Two virtues? Or just one?
If our beliefs are structured in the way epistemic infi nitism says they 
must in order to be justifi ed, then it seems that we are in a position to 
alleviate a major skeptical worry that might arise about the justifi cato-
ry status of our beliefs. This is clearly so, given that one of the favorite 
tools the skeptic uses to question the justifi catory status of our beliefs is 
the very same question the detective raises in the reason-giving game, 
viz. the “what reason?” question. Let us call the philosopher that bases 
her skeptical attack to the possibility of justifi cation on the regress of 
reasons the regress skeptic. Now, suppose that the reasons available 
to me for believing in a particular proposition are infi nitely many and 
non-repeating, which means that I am in a position to cite a reason for 
each reason that I offer and might be challenged by the regress skeptic. 
If this is so, then I cannot lose, and the regress skeptic cannot win, the 
reason-giving game. It is also true that I cannot win, and the regress 
skeptic cannot lose, it. However, it might be argued that not losing the 
reason-giving game against the regress skeptic, our notoriously power-
ful opponent, is perhaps victory enough.
The “what reason?” question raised for a particular belief starts a 
regress of reasons. And, if we maintain that there is no forthcoming 
step at which the “what question?” loses the rationale it has at the 
previous steps, then the only way for us not to lose the reason-giving 
game is by having at our disposal an infi nite (and non-repeating) chain 
of reasons. Epistemic infi nitism is simply the view that fully endorses 
the regress of reasons strongly suggested by the reason-giving game: 
it appears to be a direct outcome of an appreciation of a natural (if not 
uncontroversial) conception of the rules governing the reason-giving 
game. Furthermore, it seems that it enables a sort of response to the 
regress skeptic that does not look desperate: if the reasons available 
to me for a belief is structured in the way epistemic infi nitism says it 
must in order for me to have a justifi ed belief, then I am immune to 
skeptical challenges to the grounds of that belief in the form of “what 
reason?” questions.
It thus appears that there are two virtues of epistemic infi nitism:
 (RR) Epistemic infi nitism takes at face value what is suggested 
by the reason-giving game: in order for a subject to be justifi ed in 
believing a proposition, there must be an infi nite set of reasons 
available to the subject arranged in a non-repeating series such 
that the fi rst member, R1 is a reason for P, and the second mem-
ber, R2 is a reason for R1, and the third member, R3 is a reason 
for R2, and so on. (RR = Regress is Real)
 (RS) If a subject’s reasons for a particular belief are infi nite in 
number and structured in the way the epistemic infi nitist says 
they must in order for that belief to be justifi ed, then the reason-
giving game concerning that belief with the regress skeptic ought 
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rationally to result in a tie and therefore skeptical attacks from 
the regress of justifi cation are circumvented. (RS = Response to 
the regress Skeptic)
(RR) and (RS) provide strong support for epistemic infi nitism. As for 
(RR), we can say this: it is in general a merit of a theory that it does not 
yield a gap, or reduces the already-existing gap, between how things 
“appear” to us (not necessarily in the visual or perceptual sense) and 
how things really “are”. Any theory that yields such an appearance-
reality gap faces the often-not-lifted burden of explaining why things 
“appear” to us differently from how things really “are”. It is therefore 
a virtue of epistemic infi nitism that it endorses what “appears” to be 
a moral of the reason-giving game as a condition for propositional jus-
tifi cation. As for (RS), a general point is that any normative episte-
mological theory that provides an adequate response to the skeptic is 
preferable to those that do not. This is again because it “appears” to us 
that we have justifi ed beliefs and we want to resist the skeptical thesis 
that we have none.
(RR) and (RS) deserve a critical examination. One question that we 
might ask about (RR) is this: why exactly is epistemic infi nitism sug-
gested by the reason-giving game? And, one question that we might 
ask about (RS) is this: is it true that skeptical attacks from the regress 
of justifi cation are circumvented, given that the reason-giving game 
for that belief ought rationally to result in a tie? I will argue that an 
adequate answer to the question about (RR) paves the way for a “no” 
answer to the question about (RS). The reason why epistemic infi nitism 
is suggested by the reason-giving game is the reason why the regress 
skeptic can plausibly argue that the subject is not justifi ed in having 
a particular belief while appreciating that the reason-giving game for 
that belief ought rationally to result in a tie.
5. RR and inferential justifi cation
Refl ecting on (RR), let us start with observing that the reason-giving 
game presupposes an argumentative model of dialectical interaction 
between the detective and the defender. According to this model, a 
proper answer by the defender to the “what reason?” question raised 
by the detective with respect to one of the defender’s beliefs requires 
citing a reason (a proposition the defender believes) that effectively 
serves as a premise that purportedly supports the belief. Now, assum-
ing that there is a sense of justifi cation (or justifi ed belief) on which 
an argumentative model of dialectical interaction is also a model of 
epistemic justifi cation (see section 3), the reason-giving game presup-
poses an argumentative model of epistemic justifi cation (in that sense). 
Furthermore, since a belief’s being inferentially justifi ed is a matter of 
its owing its justifi cation to the support of other beliefs, an argumenta-
tive model of epistemic justifi cation presupposes that only those beliefs 
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that are inferentially justifi ed are justifi ed. So, given that the reason-
giving game presupposes an argumentative model of epistemic justifi -
cation, epistemic infi nitism suggested by that game presupposes that 
only those beliefs that are inferentially justifi ed are justifi ed.
A crucial point here is that the infi nite regress of reasons suggested 
by the reason-giving game and endorsed by epistemic infi nitism has to 
do with the nature of inferential justifi cation. There are two individu-
ally necessary and jointly suffi cient conditions for the inferential justi-
fi cation of a belief, captured by the following thesis:
 (IJC) A belief held by a subject is (prima facie) inferentially jus-
tifi ed if, and only if, (i) that belief is (adequately) supported by 
some of the other beliefs of the subject and (ii) those other beliefs 
of the subject are themselves justifi ed.
Let us call the condition captured by (i) the support condition, viz. that 
in order for a belief to be inferentially justifi ed, there must be another 
belief that (adequately) supports it (or there must be a suitable ‘eviden-
tial’ relation between the two beliefs). It is notoriously diffi cult to give 
an adequate account of the notion of evidential support; but fortunate-
ly, I can leave it unanalyzed in this paper. Intuitively, my belief that 
my wife is back home from the gym is supported by my belief that her 
car is parked outside but not supported by my belief that Paris is the 
capital of France. What needs to be observed for the purposes of this 
paper is that the support thesis is unquestionably true simply because 
it specifi es in part what it means to be inferentially justifi ed. Let us call 
the condition captured by (ii) the other-belief-justifi cation condition (or 
simply the justifi cation condition), viz. that in order for a belief to be 
inferentially justifi ed by another belief, the latter belief itself must be 
justifi ed. There is good reason to think that the justifi cation condition 
is required for inferential justifi cation. Suppose that John believes that 
his boss is going to fi re him and this belief is (adequately) supported 
solely by one of his other beliefs, viz. that his boss distrusts him. But 
suppose that the belief that his boss distrusts John is in turn entirely 
unsupported—John has no reason at all to believe this, and his ‘para-
noid’ tendencies are active in the formation of this belief. In this case, is 
the belief that John’s boss is going to fi re him inferentially justifi ed by 
the belief that John’s boss distrusts him, given that the former is sup-
ported by the latter? The answer appears to be a clear “no”: the belief 
that John’s boss is going to fi re him is not justifi ed and therefore not in-
ferentially justifi ed, and the reason why this is so is evidently that the 
supporting belief that John’s boss distrusts him is not justifi ed. And, 
this is just to say that the justifi cation condition is not met by John’s 
belief that his boss is going to fi re him.
The justifi cation condition for inferential justifi cation generates the 
regress of reasons in the reason-giving game. Citing a reason, R1 in 
support of the target belief that P is not suffi cient for the justifi cation 
of the belief that P: R1 must also be justifi ed. Without R1 being justifi ed, 
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the belief that P is not justifi ed in virtue of its being supported by R1. 
So, the initial question of whether the belief that P is justifi ed has not 
yet been answered by citing R1. In order to answer that question, we 
need to know whether R1 is justifi ed. And, citing R2 in support of R1 is 
not suffi cient for the justifi cation of R1: R2 must also be justifi ed. With-
out R2 being justifi ed, neither R1 nor the belief that P supported by R1 is 
justifi ed in virtue of R1’s being supported by R2. So, the initial question 
of whether the belief that P is justifi ed has not yet been answered by 
citing R1 in its support and citing R2 in support of R1. The same point 
clearly applies to all the forthcoming steps. It is because the justifi ca-
tion condition holds for inferential justifi cation that an answer to the 
initial question regarding the justifi catory status of a target belief re-
quires there being available to the subject an infi nite series of reasons. 
To further appreciate the connection between the justifi cation con-
dition and the idea that inferential justifi cation requires an infi nity of 
reasons, suppose that (IJC) is rejected in favor (IJS), which reads:
 (IJS) A belief held by a subject is (prima facie) inferentially justi-
fi ed if, and only if, that belief is (adequately) supported by some 
of the other beliefs of the subject.
(IJS) is what one gets by dropping the justifi cation condition from (IJC). 
If (IJS) were the principle that is true of inferential justifi cation, then 
there would be no troubling regress of justifi cation because it would 
then be suffi cient for the inferential justifi cation of a belief that the 
subject has another belief that evidentially supports it, whether or not 
that other belief itself is justifi ed. So, if (IJS) were true, John’s belief 
that his boss is going to fi re him, for example, would be justifi ed on the 
basis of the support it gets from his belief that his boss distrusts him. 
The question about the justifi catory status of the target belief (that 
John’s boss is going to fi re him) would then be settled by John’s citing 
the belief that his boss distrusts him. True, we could still raise the 
“what reason?” question for the belief that John’s boss distrusts him. 
So, there will still be a sort of regress of reasons. But the crucial point is 
that the sole rationale for raising that question would then be to fi gure 
out whether that belief itself is justifi ed, not whether the original target 
belief that John’s boss is going to fi re him is justifi ed. In other words, 
if (IJS) were true, the belief that John’s boss is going to fi re him would 
no longer be ‘targeted’ by the “what reason?” questions raised in subse-
quent steps once another belief that adequately supports it is cited in 
its defense. And, that is what makes the ensuing regress non-troubling 
against the skeptic questioning the justifi catory credentials of our be-
liefs. If (IJS) were true, then we would have as many justifi ed beliefs 
as the number of our beliefs that receive adequate support from other 
beliefs we have. This means that if (IJS) were true, epistemic infi nitism 
would not be suggested by the dialectic involved in the reason-giving 
game as the correct account of justifi cation.
 E. Demircioğlu, Epistemic Infi nitism, the Reason-Giving Game 95
However, given (IJC), the “what reason?” question raised at each 
step is an attempt to fi gure out whether John’s original belief under 
scrutiny—the belief that his boss is going to fi re him—is justifi ed. Its 
justifi catory status is not settled by citing another belief that adequate-
ly supports it as long as the justifi catory status of that belief is not 
settled. And, this is what makes the ensuing regress troubling against 
the regress skeptic. Given (IJC), the “what reason?” question keeps 
targeting the very fi rst belief for which it is raised at all forthcoming 
steps, and this is what suggests that the justifi cation of one and the 
same belief requires an infi nity of reasons, i.e. what suggests epistemic 
infi nitism as the correct normative account of epistemic justifi cation. 
Before proceeding further, there is one fi nal point I want to make 
about how the “if and only if” in (IJC) is to be understood. Suppose 
that a given subject’s belief that P is supported only by one of her oth-
er beliefs, R1. Suppose further that the belief that P is (inferentially) 
justifi ed. If this is so, then given (IJC), R1 must be justifi ed. However, 
R1’s being justifi ed is not merely necessary for P being justifi ed. It is 
in virtue of R1’s being justifi ed that P is justifi ed—R1’s being justifi ed 
explains why P is justifi ed. There is a sort of explanatory dependence 
relation between P being justifi ed and R1 being justifi ed, one that is not 
captured by noting that R1 being justifi ed is necessary for P being justi-
fi ed. Klein’s remarks are helpful here:
Consider a line AB and some subsegment of it, say s. Now, s is a subsegment 
of AB only if there is another subsegment of s, say s1, that is not identical 
to s (or AB), and there is some subsegment, s2, etc. In addition, any subseg-
ment consists (in part) of its own subsegments, but it is not a subsegment 
in virtue of its having subsegments. Rather, each is a subsegment in virtue 
of being a segment between the endpoints of the given segment that is not 
equivalent to the given segment. That explains why it is a subsegment. My 
point is that necessary conditions, even those that entail the existence of a 
constituent, are not necessarily part of explanatory or in-virtue-of condi-
tions. In other words, “A holds only if B holds” can be true without “A holds 
in virtue of B holding” being true. (2003: 722)
Adopting Klein’s terminology, we can say that R1 being justifi ed in the 
scenario above is not merely a necessary condition for P being justifi ed 
but is an explanatory (in-virtue-of) condition for P being justifi ed: it is 
a part of the explanation why P is justifi ed. As I understand it, (IJC) 
specifi es not only the necessary conditions but also the explanatory 
conditions for an inferential justifi cation of a belief. What it says is to 
be understood along the following lines: if a given belief is inferentially 
justifi ed, then it is inferentially justifi ed in virtue of the fact that it is 
supported (at least) by another belief and the fact that that other belief 
is justifi ed. The “if and only if” condition involved in (IJC) is to be con-
ceived as an explanatory condition.
The upshot of this section is this. (RR) is the thesis that epistemic 
infi nitism takes at face value what is suggested by the reason-giving 
game. (RR) is true simply because the reason-giving game suggests 
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that the justifi cation of one and the same belief requires an infi nity of 
reasons. And, what explains why the reason-giving game suggests this 
is (IJC) or, more particularly, the justifi cation condition for inferential 
justifi cation (viz. a belief is inferentially justifi ed on the basis of an-
other belief only if that other belief itself is justifi ed, where the “only if” 
is meant to capture a sort of explanatory dependence).
6. RS and the regress skeptic
The question I now want to answer is whether (RS) is true. In this sec-
tion, I will argue that even if it is true that the reason-giving game for 
a given belief between the regress skeptic and the subject satisfying the 
infi nitist criteria ought rationally to result in a tie, skeptical attacks 
from the regress of justifi cation are still not circumvented. If so, (RS) 
is also false.
Suppose that I and the regress skeptic have been playing the rea-
son-giving game for my belief that P for quite a while, and we have 
left, say, thousands of steps behind, and both of us have started to lose 
patience. The skeptic recognizes that I have skillfully managed to cite 
an adequate reason for each belief that I have so far asserted and now 
openly concedes that I deserve a tie in the reason-giving game, that he 
cannot win the reason-giving game. This is a concession that the skep-
tic cannot succeed by continuing to raise the “what reason?” question in 
rationally concluding that my target belief is not justifi ed. But now the 
skeptic realizes a crucial fact about the structure of my reasons, which 
he concedes to be infi nite and non-repeating, and decides to change his 
strategy. Rather than continuing pointlessly to raise the “what rea-
son?” question, the skeptic argues as follows:
 Look, I agree that you are in a position to provide an adequate 
answer to every “what reason?” question I raise for your beliefs. 
This is a remarkable feat; and to be honest, I was not expecting 
this. But now I realize that your victory is Pyrrhic, one that in 
effect signals your demise. You must agree with me that your 
belief that P can be justifi ed on the basis of the reason you cite in 
its support only if that reason itself, which I grant you believe in, 
is justifi ed, and this reason you cite in support of P is justifi ed on 
the basis of another reason you cite in its support only if that lat-
ter reason itself, which I grant you believe in, is justifi ed, and so 
on. This is just to take note of the fact that there is justifi cation 
condition for inferential justifi cation. Now, combine this with my 
concession that the structure of your reasons are infi nite, and 
we get the result that your belief that P is not justifi ed. This 
is because, given the infi nity of the structure, the justifi cation 
condition is never satisfi ed for your belief that P—the “only if” 
(as an explanatory dependence condition) is never eliminated or 
discharged: what we get is an infi nity of conditionals structured 
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like e0 is justifi ed only if e1 is, e1 is justifi ed only if e2 is, and so on, 
and it is clear that one can never get that e0 is justifi ed from such 
a structure.
Let me call this argument the argument from the justifi cation condi-
tion. The argument is an old one, various versions of which have been 
presented by a number of philosophers in the past. To take just a few 
examples, the central point of the argument is made, sometimes meta-
phorically or cryptically, by the following remarks:
The mode of reasoning based upon the regress ad infi nitum is that whereby 
we assert the thing adduced as a proof of the matter needs a further proof, 
and this again another, and so on ad infi nitum, so that the consequence is 
suspension, as we possess no starting point for our argument. (Sextus Em-
piricus 1976: 166)
If there is a branch with no terminus, that means that no matter how far 
we extend the branch the last element is still a belief that is mediately justi-
fi ed if at all. Thus, as far as this structure goes, whenever we stop adding 
elements we still have not shown that the relevant necessary condition for 
the mediate justifi cation of the original belief is satisfi ed. Thus the structure 
does not exhibit the original belief as mediately justifi ed. (Alston 1986: 82)
Consider a train of infi nite length, in which each carriage moves because 
the one in front of it moves. Even supposing that fact is an adequate ex-
planation for the movement of each carriage, one is tempted to say, in the 
absence of a locomotive, that one still has no explanation for the motion of 
the whole. And that metaphor might aptly be transferred to the case of jus-
tifi cation in general. (Harkinson 1995: 189)
The argument from the justifi cation condition purports to show that 
epistemic infi nitism is not a non-skeptical alternative: if my beliefs are 
structured in the way the epistemic infi nitist says they must, then none 
of those beliefs are justifi ed because the justifi cation condition for the 
inferential justifi cation of each of those beliefs on the basis of (some of) 
the rest of my beliefs is never satisfi ed. Suppose that P is the proposi-
tion I believe whose justifi catory status is in question. Suppose further 
that the justifi catory status of P depends upon the justifi catory status 
of R1 (which I believe and provides evidential support for P), and the 
justifi catory status of R1 depends on R2 (which I believe and provides 
evidential support for R1), and so on to infi nity in a non-repeating way. 
If this is so, then any member of this chain of propositions is justifi ed 
only if the next member upon whose justifi cation the justifi cation of 
that member depends is justifi ed. Since for each member in the chain 
there is another member upon whose justifi cation its justifi cation de-
pends, and since there is no fi nal member in the chain, none of the 
members of the chain is justifi ed. The justifi cation of each proposition 
in the chain involves a promissory note that is never paid, postponed to 
infi nity. If so, (RS) is false.
The argument from the justifi cation condition can be reformulated 
as a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that P is justifi ed. Where does its 
justifi cation come from (or what does it depend on)? From (or on) R1. 
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But where does R1’s justifi cation come from? From R2. So, we can say 
that P’s justifi cation comes from R1 in the fi rst instance and from R2 
in the second instance. Now where does R2’s justifi cation come from? 
From R3. So, P’s justifi cation comes from R1 in the fi rst instance and 
from R2 in the second instance and from R3 in the third instance. But 
now the question is: where does P’s justifi cation come from in the last 
instance? If P is justifi ed, there must be an answer to this question: its 
justifi cation must ultimately come from somewhere. This is because 
nothing can come from somewhere if it does not ultimately come from 
anywhere. Since given infi nitism there is no answer to this question 
(there is no last instance), we arrive at the contradiction that P is both 
justifi ed and unjustifi ed. If this is so, the hypothesis that gives rise to 
the contradiction (i.e., P is justifi ed) should be rejected.
7. Infi nitist responses considered
My main aim here is not to argue that the argument from the justifi ca-
tion condition is decisive but, more modestly, to argue that it is avail-
able to the regress skeptic willing to adopt the skeptical outcome ap-
proach but realizing that the reason-giving game played with a subject 
satisfying the infi nitist criteria for justifi cation ought to result in a tie. 
However, one might still reasonably wonder how strong the argument 
is or what the responses available to the infi nitist are. In this section, I 
will address two objections the infi nitist might level against the argu-
ment from the justifi cation condition.
According to the fi rst objection, the argument from the justifi ca-
tion condition takes for granted a particular conception of inferential 
justifi cation, one that the infi nitist is not entitled to endorse. Accord-
ing to this conception, the structure of inferential justifi cation is lin-
ear and the primary bearers of inferential justifi cation are individual 
propositions (rather than systems of propositions). On this conception, 
a proposition’s being inferentially justifi ed is a property it might pos-
sibly have solely in virtue of another’s proposition’s transferring to it 
whatever justifi cation it antecedently has thanks to there being suit-
able evidential relations between the two propositions. However, the 
infi nitist might reject the linear conception of inferential justifi cation 
and opt for accounting for the justifi cation of a proposition on the basis 
of its relations to other propositions by adopting a holistic conception. 
In fact, this is what Klein qua the arch-infi nitist exactly offers. Klein’s 
infi nitism is “warrant-emergentist” (2005a: 136), according to which 
justifi cation is not property that can be transferred from one proposi-
tion to another but rather is a property that emerges whenever there 
is an endless, non-repeating sets of propositions available as reasons. 
Warrant-emergentist (or holistic) infi nitism holds that “Being justi-
fi ed…is not a troublesome dependent property because a proposition 
being justifi ed…does not arise in virtue of another proposition being 
justifi ed—a proposition is justifi ed for S in virtue of being a member 
 E. Demircioğlu, Epistemic Infi nitism, the Reason-Giving Game 99
of a set of propositions each member having the required properties” 
(2003: 723).14
The skeptic might grant that the argument from the justifi cation 
condition conceives the justifi cation of a proposition on the basis of its 
relations to other propositions on the model of a transfer-account of 
justifi cation, a model that takes justifi cation-conferring relations to be 
linear rather than holistic; and, he might therefore grant that there 
might be some versions of infi nitism, Klein’s version being an example, 
that escape its threat. However, the skeptic might now wonder, quite 
plausibly I think, what motivation or rationale there is for adopting ho-
listic infi nitism. The crucial point is that what generates the regress of 
reasons is the linear conception of inferential justifi cation: it is because 
a proposition, if it is inferentially justifi ed, can receive its justifi cation 
from another proposition that already has it that we are off to a regress 
of reasons each of whose justifi cation depends on that of its successor. 
Infi nitism is the view that fully embraces the regress of reasons that 
ensues from the linear conception of inferential justifi cation. And, if 
the linear conception is abandoned, then it is unclear whether there is 
any good rationale for holding that justifi cation requires an infi nitely 
long sequence of reasons—the entire rationale that one might possibly 
have for preferring infi nitism over its alternatives seems to be severely 
undermined. The moral is that holistic infi nitism escapes the argument 
from the justifi cation condition at the cost of undermining what might 
make infi nitism an attractive option in the fi rst place.15
According to the second objection, the argument from the justifi ca-
tion condition rests on a failure to distinguish a local explanation of 
the justifi cation of a particular proposition from a global explanation of 
why there are any justifi ed propositions at all.16 Suppose I want to ex-
plain why this billiard ball is moving now. Here what is to be explained 
is a particular event, the motion of this particular billiard ball. It seems 
that I can make reference to another particular event, Mr. Billiard’s 
hitting that ball with his cue, in order to explain (at least partially) 
why it is moving. This is a local explanation of the motion of the ball, 
one that is purported to explain that particular event. However, sup-
pose now that I want to explain why there is motion at all, why there 
is some motion rather than none at all. If this is the case, then I seek a 
global explanation of the very fact that there are things that move. The 
billiard ball is among the things that move; but if the explanandum is 
why there is motion at all, it seems that an appeal to Mr. Billiard’s hit-
14 Klein also writes: “The infi nitist, like the coherentist, takes propositional 
justifi cation to be what I called an emergent property that arises in sets of 
propositions. In particular, the infi nitist holds that propositional justifi cation arises 
in sets of propositions with an infi nite and non-repeating structure such that each 
new member serves as a reason for the preceding one” (2007: 26).
15 For further discussion, see, for instance, Demircioglu (2018).
16 The distinction is widely discussed in the literature on the cosmological 
argument for the existence of God. I borrow it from Cameron (2018).
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ting the ball is inadequate as an explanation of the motion of the ball 
since that hitting is an action that causes the motion of the billiard ball 
in virtue of the motion it itself exhibits. Such an “explanation” appears 
to be blatantly circular in its attempt to provide an explanans by an ap-
peal to the explanandum itself. Armed with this distinction, the infi nit-
ist might now claim that the regress of reasons is purported to provide 
a local explanation of the justifi cation of particular propositions but not 
a global explanation of why there are any justifi ed propositions at all, 
and as such it is not threatened by the argument from the justifi cation 
condition.17
There are a number of things the skeptic might say in response to 
this objection. First, the skeptic need not let the distinction between 
local and global explanations go unchallenged. The point of the distinc-
tion is to make room for local explanations of particular things of a 
certain kind (e.g., this moving ball) while admitting that there might 
be more to global explanations of the existence of things of that kind 
in general (e.g., things that are moving) than what local explanations 
can provide. However, it is not clear that there is really room for such 
a maneuver. It might be plausibly argued that one can only provide a 
local explanation of particular things of a certain kind if one can pro-
vide a global explanation of the existence of things of that kind. (Can 
I really explain the motion of this ball without being in a position to 
explain motion in general? Can the local explanation of the motion of 
that ball be divorced from the global explanation of motion in general?) 
Secondly, even if a distinction between local and global explanations 
can be plausibly drawn in the way suggested by the objection, it is not 
clear that a philosophical theory of knowledge and justifi ed belief can 
rest satisfi ed with a local explanation of why a given particular belief is 
justifi ed. A natural meta-epistemological view is that an epistemologi-
cal theory aims to achieve a level of generality characterized by a sort 
of global worry: How can there be justifi ed beliefs at all? If all infi nit-
ism has to offer is local explanations of why some particular beliefs 
are justifi ed without a global explanation of how there can be justifi ed 
beliefs at all, then it appears to be seriously incomplete as an epistemo-
logical theory of knowledge and justifi ed belief.
I do not for a moment presume that this is the end of the dialec-
tic between the regress skeptic and the infi nitist, but I hold that the 
dialectic so far attests to the power of the skeptical outcome approach 
the regress skeptic might adopt by endorsing the argument from the 
justifi cation condition.
17 Klein (2003) suggests that this response is available to the infi nitist but does 
not explicitly endorse it.
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8. Conclusion
To sum up the discussion above, here then lies what I think is an ulti-
mate tragedy of epistemic infi nitism. Epistemic infi nitism is suggested 
by the rules governing the reason-giving game as a proper response 
to the skeptic: the only way for us not to lose the reason-giving game 
against the skeptic is by our having at our disposal an infi nity of rea-
sons structured in a certain way. And, the reason why epistemic infi nit-
ism is suggested by the rules governing the reason-giving game is that 
there is justifi cation condition for inferential justifi cation: simply citing 
a reason in support of a belief is not enough to justify it, the subject 
must also be justifi ed in believing the reason she cites. However, the 
justifi cation condition for inferential justifi cation can be deployed in 
an argument that epistemic infi nitism fails to deliver a non-skeptical 
result. So, what makes epistemic infi nitism come out as a viable option 
against the skeptic in the reason-giving game (namely, the justifi cation 
condition) also renders it susceptible to a powerful skeptical assault. It 
is true that if our beliefs are structured in the way the epistemic infi nit-
ist says they must, then we do not lose the reason-giving game against 
the regress skeptic. But, despite this, I have argued that the skeptical 
outcome approach is still very much alive.
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